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## A SEMANTICS FOR THE CALCULUS E OF ENTAILMENT

In this paper a semantics for the calculus E of entailment is constructed. This semantics is based on a notion of E-structure which is a generalization of Kripke S4 models. We use this semantics to prove that a hypothesis of D. Prawitz [3] and R.K.Meyer [5] on the equivalence of calculus E and NR-theory of entailment is false.

We begin from the definition of  $E_{ICD}$ -structure which gives a semantics for the calculus  $E_{ICD}$  - the positive fragment of E. Axioms for E and  $E_{ICD}$  can be found for example in [1].

Let S be a set, P be a non-empty subset of S, R be a ternary relation on S. The system  $\langle S, P, R \rangle$  is called an  $E_{ICD}$  - structure, if it satisfies the following conditions for all U, V, W, X, Y in S.

$$E 1. (\exists t \in P) R(t, v, v)$$

$$E 2. x \in P \wedge R(x, u, v) \implies (\exists t \in P) R(u, t, v)$$

$$E 3. R(u, w, x) \wedge R(x, v, y) \implies (\exists z)(R(w, z, y) \wedge R(u, v, z))$$

$$E 4. R(u, v, x) \implies (\exists z)(R(u, v, z) \wedge R(z, v, x))$$

$$E 5. x \in P \wedge R(x, v, u) \wedge R(u, w, y) \implies R(v, w, y)$$

$$E 6. x \in P \wedge R(x, v, u) \wedge R(w, u, y) \implies R(w, v, y)$$

Let  $\underline{S} = \langle S, P, R \rangle$  be an  $E_{ICD}$  - structure. By forcing on  $\underline{S}$  we mean a relation  $\models$  between elements of S and formulas

of  $E_{ICD}$  with the following properties:

(i)  $u \in P \wedge R(u,v,w) \implies (v \models p \implies w \models p)$  for every propositional variable  $p$ ,

(ii)  $v \models (\alpha \& \beta) \iff v \models \alpha \text{ and } v \models \beta$ ,

(iii)  $v \models (\alpha \vee \beta) \iff v \models \alpha \text{ or } v \models \beta$ ,

(iv)  $v \models (\alpha \rightarrow \beta) \iff (\forall u,w) (R(v,u,w) \wedge u \models \alpha \implies w \models \beta)$

(where  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  are arbitrary formulae and  $v,u,w$  are elements of  $S$ ).

We say that a formula  $\alpha$  is true in the  $E_{ICD}$  - structure  $\underline{S} = \langle S, P, R \rangle$  by forcing  $\models$  on  $\underline{S}$ , if  $x \models \alpha$  for every  $x \in P$ . A formula  $\alpha$  is valid in  $\underline{S}$  if  $\alpha$  is true in  $\underline{S}$  by every relation of forcing on  $\underline{S}$ .

THE COMPLETENESS THEOREM FOR  $E_{ICD}$ . For any formula  $\alpha$  of the calculus  $E_{ICD}$ ,  $\alpha$  is a theorem of  $E_{ICD}$  iff  $\alpha$  is valid in all  $E_{ICD}$  - structures.

Recall that the calculus NR [5] is defined as the result of adding S4-style theory of necessity to the calculus R of relevant implication. Let us introduce an entailment connective on the definition  $\alpha \implies \beta = N(\alpha \rightarrow \beta)$ , where  $\rightarrow$  is relevant implication and  $N$  is necessity. D.Prawitz and R.K.Meyer conjectured that NR-theory of entailment coincides exactly with that of E.

Let us consider the formula:

$$(p \implies (q \implies r)) \& (q \implies p \vee r) \implies (q \implies r)$$

G.E.Minc showed that this formula is a theorem of NR and conjectured that it is not provable in E. We prove this

conjecture by using of our semantics. The following system  $\underline{S} = \langle S, P, R \rangle$  is an  $E_{ICD}$  - structure, where  $S = \{e, a, b, c\}$ ,  $P = \{e\}$ ,  $R$  contains all the triples  $\langle e, x, x \rangle$ ,  $\langle x, e, x \rangle$ ,  $\langle x, x, x \rangle$ , as well as  $\langle a, b, c \rangle$ ,  $\langle b, c, c \rangle$ ,  $\langle a, c, c \rangle$ ,  $\langle a, b, b \rangle$ ,  $\langle b, b, c \rangle$ ,  $\langle a, e, b \rangle$ ,  $\langle a, e, c \rangle$ ,  $\langle b, e, c \rangle$ . Then the formula  $(p \rightarrow (q \rightarrow r)) \ \& \ (q \rightarrow pvr) \rightarrow (q \rightarrow r)$  is not true in  $\underline{S}$  by  $\models$ , where  $\models$  is the least relation of forcing on  $\underline{S}$  such that  $c \models p$ ,  $b \models q$ ,  $b \models r$ . Therefore this formula is not a theorem of  $E_{ICD}$ . It follows from [2], that this formula is not provable also in  $E$ .

Now we extend the semantics for the whole  $E$ . The system  $\underline{S} = \langle S, P, R, g \rangle$  is called an  $E$  - structure, if  $\langle S, P, R \rangle$  is an  $E_{ICD}$  - structure,  $g$  is an involution on  $S$  (i.e. a function such that  $g(g(x)) = x$ ) and the following conditions are fulfilled:

E 7.  $R(u, v, w) \implies R(u, g(w), g(v))$

E 8.  $R(u, g(u), u)$ .

The forcing on the  $E$  - structure  $\underline{S} = \langle S, P, R, g \rangle$  is to satisfy the requirements (i) - (iv) of the definition of forcing on the  $E_{ICD}$  - structure and moreover.

(v)  $v \models \alpha \iff g(v) \not\models \alpha$ .

The notion of validity is analogous to the corresponding notion for  $E_{ICD}$  - structures. We have then

THE COMPLETENESS THEOREM FOR  $E$ . For any formula  $\alpha$  of the calculus  $E$ ,  $\alpha$  is a theorem of  $E$  iff  $\alpha$  is valid in all  $E$  - structures.

REMARK. R.Routley and R.K.Meyer proved [4], that it is enough to consider  $E_{ICD}$  - structures in which the set P contains only one element. It does not hold for E - structures. If  $\underline{S} = \langle S, P, R, g \rangle$  is an E - structure and P contains the only element, then the formula  $\forall p((p \rightarrow p) \rightarrow p)$  underivable in E is valid in  $\underline{S}$ .

We note also, that there is a direct connection between Kripke S4 models and E structures. Recall that S4 model is a system  $\langle S, \leq \rangle$  where  $\leq$  is a transitive, reflexive relation on S. Set  $P = S$ ,  $g(x) = x$ , and  $R(x, y, z) \equiv x \leq y = z$ . Then  $\langle S, P, R, g \rangle$  is an E - structure.

#### R E F E R E N C E S

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